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Abstract
We use several well-being measures that combine average income with a measure of
inequality to undertake international, intertemporal, and global comparisons of well-being.
The conclusions emerging from the analysis are that our well-being measures drastically
change our impression of levels of well-being at the national and, more so, at the global level.
They also significantly affect the ranking of countries, when compared to rankings based on
real incomes. The impact on these measures on temporal trends in well-being is smaller on
average, but significant for a number of countries where inequality changed considerably in
past decades. These results appear not very sensitive to the data on inequality which this
analysis is based upon. However, since the inclusion of inequality has an important impact on
wellbeing comparisons and it is of great importance to generate more consistent and
intertemporally as well as internationally comparable data on inequality that are necessary for
such comparisons.
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Despite its well-known short-comings, GNP per capita is still the most widely used in-
dicator for comparisons of well-being across countries; and the per capita growth rate is
still the most common indicator of changes in well-being.1
The exclusive reliance on this measure is largely due to pragmatic grounds. GNP
(and GDP) are important measures of production possibility and business cycles, which
ensure that great eﬀorts are made to measure them timely, accurately, and according to
internationally agreed standards. With these data readily available, it is tempting to rely
on them for international and intertemporal comparisons of well-being. Moreover, it is
argued by many that GNP per capita and growth of per capita income is still the best
available proxy for changes in well-being as it is highly correlated with more complete or
more broad-based measures of well-being (e.g. Dollar and Kraay, 2000; Ravallion, 1997).
Nevertheless, it continues to be the case that its neglect of income distribution is
one of the most serious short-comings of GNP as an indicator of welfare. In particular,
a broad range of philosophical approaches to the measurement of welfare (ranging from
utilitarianism with some very reasonable assumptions about utility functions to Rawlsian
reasoning or Sen’s capability approach) would suggest that, ceteris paribus, high economic
inequality reduces aggregate well-being. In fact, there exists a range of measures for well-
being that make use of this insight and combine mean income with some measure of
income inequality to arrive at better measures of welfare than average income alone (e.g.
Atkinson, 1970; Sen, 1973; Dagum, 1990; Ahluwalia and Chenery, 1974).
In the past the application of those measures was limited, mainly because of lack
of data on income distribution. Recent years, however, have seen great advances being
made in the generation of data on income inequality (e.g. Deininger and Squire, 1996;
Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; WIID, 2000). Thus it seems natural to apply well-being
measures that combine GNP per capita and income distribution to these new data and
investigate to what extent these measures will generate comparisons of well-being across
space and time that are substantially diﬀerent from pure per capita income comparisons.
This exercise is the purpose of this paper.
We ﬁnd that the measures that include income inequality in the assessment of well-
being have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on international comparisons of well-being. Several
countries, including Brazil, Mexico, Chile, but also the US have considerably lower levels
of well-being and thus rankings of well-being than suggested by per capita income, while
other countries, including Indonesia, Bangladesh, Finland, and Belgium have a higher well-
being rank than their income rank. For many countries, these ﬁndings are quite robust to
using diﬀerent data sources; for others, including some OECD countries, the international
comparisons are substantially aﬀected by the choice of data set. At the same time, we ﬁnd
that consideration of inequality has a comparatively minor impact on intertemporal
comparisons of well-being as in most countries of the world income distribution has
remained fairly stable over the period of time considered here (esp. when compared to the
much larger ﬂuctuations in income growth, see also Lundberg and Squire, 1999). Only in
1There are other indicators, such as the Human Development Index and related measures, that have
attempted to generate alternatives to this exclusive reliance on income, but they have been criticized
for their choice of indicators, aggregation rules, and their neglect of distribution of the achievements
considered (see Srinivasan, 1994; Ravallion, 1997).
2a few countries (including nearly all transition countries, Britain, and the US) does the
consideration of inequality markedly change assessments of changes in well-being. Finally,
we ﬁnd that due to the extremely large global income inequality, global well-being
is very much lower than it would be if incomes were more equally distributed. For the
sample of countries that we consider in our assessment of global income inequality (which
unfortunately excludes many of the poorest countries), changes in global well-being are
larger than suggested by the income growth measure as inequality seems to have declined
in our sample of countries, especially in the 1980s.
It should be pointed out at the start that this paper presents tentative results of an
exercise that, to some degree, is still speculative. On the theoretical side, we do not wish
to propose deﬁnitive measures of well-being. Instead, we merely wish to illustrate how
reasonable ways of incorporating inequality in an assessment of well-being will change our
impression of well-being across space and time. On the empirical front, our conclusions
should be seen as equally tentative. While we have many more data on income inequality
across space and time than we used to, the accuracy and comparability of many of them
remains a huge problem (see Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001; Deininger and Squire, 1996).
We have undertaken some sensitivity analyses using possibly better data available for some
points in time in a limited number of countries and using regression-based adjustments.
None of this can substitute for long consistent time series of internationally standardized
and comparable data which are at present not available. Moreover, our international
comparisons of inequality are limited to a small number of countries in the early years
we consider (1960, 1970) so that it is diﬃcult to say much about temporal trends in
inequality and well-being in many countries. And even for these countries we often only
have very irregular data points on inequality so that we cannot really talk about consistent
time series. Finally, our ’global’ analysis is restricted to some 80 per cent of the world’s
population, and the 20 per cent excluded are clearly not a random sample. To achieve
such good coverage and include the most populous African countries as well, we had,
in addition, to make somewhat heroic assumptions as we only have reasonable data for
some 76 per cent of the world’s population in 1998. Despite these short-comings, we are
nevertheless conﬁdent that this analysis generates a number of important and usable
ﬁndings that should be fairly robust to most of the many data problems we encounter.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses the theoretical issues
involved in comparing well-being across space and time. Section 3 introduces the measures
of well-being we use in the paper. Section 4 discusses the data and our manipulations for
this analysis. Section 5 presents the results for the international analysis, section 6 the
sensitivity analysis. The results of the intertemporal comparisons are shown in section 7
and section 8 presents our global analysis. Section 9 concludes.
32 The Theory of Well-Being and Real-Income Com-
parisons
Despite a long history, the theory of welfare judgements across space and time continues
to be beset with conceptual and practical problems. Ever since it became evident that
social choice theory was not yielding acceptable2 procedures for making social welfare
judgements, such judgements have been based on axiomatic approaches to welfare mea-
surement. Those are based on a conceptualization of what constitutes welfare and then
the derivation of an indicator that, under certain stated assumptions, can adequately
measure the chosen concept.
Applying such measures to welfare comparisons across space and time generate ad-
ditional problems. Those are discussed in detail in Sen (1982, 1984) and will only be
summarized here. In particular, the theory of welfare comparisons is based on situational
comparisons, i.e. whether a person would hypothetically prefer situation A to B. This com-
parison thus takes place at the same time and is done by the same person. Intertemporal
or international welfare comparisons, however, address diﬀerent questions. Intertemporal
comparisons have to contend with the problem that the persons are not evaluating the
welfare of two situations simultaneously, but sequentially. This may generate problems if
overall perceptions of welfare or tastes have changed over time (in addition to the problem
that not all the people are alive in both periods). Comparisons across space, as done in
inter-country comparisons, are even more diﬃcult as now the persons diﬀer whose wel-
fare is being compared.3 The comparison could be made using the price (or other welfare
weight) vectors of either country, which would not necessarily generate the same result. In
addition to this theoretical problem, the comparability of prices also throws up another
problem, namely the appropriate exchange rate for international comparisons. In the past,
most real income comparisons were based on oﬃcial exchange rates despite the knowledge
that they are often distorted as a result of speculation and currency restrictions, and that
they imply a systematic underevaluation of the non-traded sector in poorer countries. In
recent years, the International Comparison Programme (ICP)4 has generated purchasing
power parity estimates of GDP and GNP based on international prices that try to address
these particular short-comings.5
Thus there are some important conceptual questions that relate to such comparisons.
Only if one places restrictions on intertemporal changes and international diﬀerences in
2Acceptable is meant in the sense of obeying minimal requirements such as the four conditions stated
by Arrow in his famous impossibility result (Arrow, 1963). See also Sen (1973, 1999) for a discussion.
3One could try to translate an international comparison into a situational comparison, i.e. asking the
British whether they would prefer to live in Britain this year or in France this year. This throws up
considerable problems, however, as it is not clear which British person should compare themselves to
which French person, or whose welfare function should be used. For a discussion of those issues, see Sen
(1982, 1984).
4The ICP produces estimates of the economies’ main aggregates which are comparable across countries.
Purchasing power parities are generated and used for converting the data into a common currency (UN,
1992).
5While the data generated by these methods are widely used, they are not beyond question. In partic-
ular, the resulting adjusted per capita incomes are sensitive to the choice of ’international prices’ which
is closer to the prices prevailing in rich countries (Berry, Bourguignon, and Morrison, 1991; Hill, 2000).
Moreover, as section 5 reveals, PPP adjustments can diﬀer in their outcomes as the diﬀerences between
the World Bank estimates and the Penn World Tables demonstrate.
4preferences, these comparisons can yield meaningful outcomes. Given the ubiquity of such
comparisons, it appears that most analysts are willing to make such assumptions.
The most commonly used indicator for welfare comparisons across space and time
is real per capita income.6 It can be derived from utilitarian welfare economics using
three alternative sets of assumptions. One set would demand everyone to have identical
unchanging cardinal utility functions where income (or consumption)7 enters the utility
function linearly (e.g. in the simplest form, every unit of consumption generates one unit
of utility). An alternative set of assumptions could allow for more realistic concave util-
ity functions, but would still require identical utility functions and require in addition
that everyone is earning the per capita income and thus consumes the mean commodity
bundle (Sen, 1984). A third set is based on Samuelson (1947) and takes an ’individual-
istic approach’ to welfare measurement. Under this approach, we recover social welfare
from individual welfare based on revealed preferences using the Pareto principle. If pref-
erences are complete, convex, and monotonically increasing, if each person’s welfare only
depends on her purchases (i.e. no externalities and public goods), if there are no market
imperfections on the buyer’s side, and if each person is rational in the sense that her
choices reﬂect her welfare ranking, then the ratio of market prices should equal the ratio
of intra-personal weights (marginal rates of substitution) attached to these goods. These
assumptions are not suﬃcient, however, to ensure that the market prices say anything
about the valuation of a good going to two diﬀerent people, as this requires interpersonal
comparisons. To be able to make such interpersonal comparisons which is required for
all real income comparisons, we need to assume in addition that the income distribution
is ’optimal’ in the sense that the ethical worth of each person’s marginal dollar is equal
(Samuelson, 1947).
All three sets of assumptions are problematic. While many aspects of the various
approaches appear unrealistic, the need to explicitly ignore the distribution of income in
a welfare comparison is particularly unpalatable. Ignoring income distribution through
the assumption of linear utility functions, through the assumption of everyone having the
same income, or through the assumption of income distribution being ’optimal’ from a
welfare point of view is all equally debatable. In fact, both theoretical considerations (e.g.
declining marginal utility of income derived from convex preferences) as well as empirical
observations (e.g. about risk aversion and insurance) clearly suggest that neither utility
functions are linear in income or consumption, nor that the existing distribution of incomes
is ’optimal’ from a social welfare point of view. Instead, these theoretical and empirical
considerations point to concave utility functions, i.e. that inequality reduces aggregate
welfare as the marginal utility of income among the poor is much higher than among the
rich.8
Non-utilitarian views of welfare would also suggest that income inequality reduces
aggregate well-being. For example, Sen’s capabilitity approach (Sen, 1987) which calls for
a maximization of people’s capability to function (e.g. the capability to be healthy, well-
nourished, adequately housed, etc.) also exhibits declining marginal returns in the income
6There are well-known omissions and distortions of GNP as a measure of the value created in an
economy. These issues will not be discussed further here.
7We abstract from the diﬃculties associated with the treatment of saving in an indicator of welfare.
For a discussion, see the paper by Osberg and Sharpe (2000).
8This is inherent also in the approach by Graaf (1957) and Sen (1982) who treat the same good going
to two diﬀerent people as two diﬀerent goods and thus explicitly do away with the distinction between
size and distribution of income as the ’welfare depends on them both’ (Sen, 1982).
5space.9 Similarly, application of Rawlsian principles would also suggest that welfare is
higher in societies where inequality is lower (Rawls, 1971).10
One approach to improve upon the welfare content of real income comparisons is
therefore to jettison this neglect of income distribution and incorporate the notion of
declining marginal welfare returns of income. Each of the measures proposed in the next
section does precisely this in slightly diﬀerent ways.
Before turning to this issue, however, it may be useful to consider one explicit objection
to the incorporation of distributional issues in an assessment of well-being. In particular,
it may be argued that redistribution reduces the long-term growth potential of an econ-
omy because higher inequality will lead to higher growth rates. This would suggest, that
there is a trade-oﬀ between higher well-being associated with today’s lower inequality and
lower well-being associated with the subsequently reduced economic growth. While such
dynamic considerations go beyond the scope of this analysis and would, in any case, re-
quire the inclusion of other dynamic issues (e.g. the role of savings and of depreciation of
human, natural, and physical capital in long-term well-being of nations)11, there is a grow-
ing consensus that this trade-oﬀ between distribution and growth does not exist. In fact, if
anything, the debate has recently shifted in the opposite direction suggesting that initial
inequality lowers subsequent growth prospects rather than increases them (e.g. Deininger
and Squire, 1998; Alesina and Rodrick, 1994; Clarke, 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 1994;
Klasen, 1999). While these ﬁndings are still tentative and subject to some debate12, they
suggest that the older claim, that high inequality is necessary for growth, does not seem
to be born out by the facts (see also Klasen, 1994).
3 The Well-Being Measures Used
In this section we describe some measures that jointly consider per capita income and
its distribution and therefore avoid the particularly problematic neglect of income dis-
tribution in a consideration of welfare. Most are well-known in the inequality literature
although not all of them have been used explicitly for aggregate welfare comparisons. All
share the feature that they can be summarized by the following formula:
W = µ(1 − I) where: 0 ≤ I ≤ 1
9For example, there appears to be a concave relationship between income and life expectancy, and
income and educational achievement. For a discussion, see Klasen (1994).
10In the lexicographic version of the maximin principle, only the position of the worst oﬀ is relevant; if
one generalizes a bit, one would get a more continuous declining marginal valuation of income. Similarly,
Hirsch’s views on the social limits to growth also imply declining aggregate well-being as a result of
inequality. For details see Hirsch (1977) and Klasen (1994).
11One might also want to consider longevity in conjunction with income and income inequality to
measure how long people are able to enjoy their incomes. For a discussion, see Berry, Bourguignon, and
Morrison (1991).
12See, for example, Lundberg and Squire (1999) who regard growth and income inequality as jointly
determined rather than one causing the other; they also ﬁnd that inequality is particularly bad for income
growth among the poor, while it has a diﬀerent eﬀect for income growth among the rich.
6Welfare W is a function of mean income µ, reduced by a measure of inequality I. Thus,
the existing degree of inequality adjusts mean income downward to reﬂect the welfare loss
associated with the (unequal) distribution of that mean income. We will consider several
measures because there are on the one hand diﬀerences with respect to the intensity of
’welfare penalty’ that is imposed. On the other hand the measures vary in the way they
penalize diﬀerent types of inequality.
The ﬁrst measure considered here was proposed by Sen (1982) and incorporates in-
equality by using the Gini coeﬃcient G:
S = µ(1 − G)
The Sen measure can be derived by replacing Samuelson’s problematic ’optimal dis-
tribution’ assumption by the assumption of ’rank order weighting’ (Sen, 1973). Individual
incomes will be weighted according to their rank in the income distribution (with the
richest person receiving rank 1 and thus the lowest weight for her income). It can also be
derived from a utility function where individuals consider not only their own income, but
the entire income distribution, with particular emphasis on the number of people with
incomes below or above one’s own (Dagum, 1990). Thus preferences are assumed to be
interdependent which accords well with recent empirical ﬁndings (e.g. Easterlin, 1995;
Banerjee, 1997).
A variant of this measure was proposed by Dagum (1990):
D = µ(1 − G)
1 + G = µ(1 − 2G
1 + G)
Clearly, the Dagum measure is a more extreme version of the Sen measure as it results
in a higher penalty because of the denominator which imposes an additional punishment
for inequality. The Dagum measure is also based on interdependent preferences and implies
that people receive a further welfare penalty from the people ahead of them in the income
distribution which also appears to be a reasonable assumption.13
In addition, we consider two versions of the Atkinson welfare measure. The Atkinson
measure was developed as an indicator of inequality that explicitly considers the welfare
loss associated with inequality in the measure (Atkinson, 1970). But one can equally well
just use the way the welfare loss is calculated, the equally distributed equivalent income,
as the welfare measure itself.14 This equally distributed equivalent income is the amount
of income that, if distributed equally, would yield the same welfare as the actual mean
income and its present (unequal) distribution (Deaton, 1997). The general form of this
measure is:15
13See Dagum (1990) for a derivation and justiﬁcation of this measure.
14This has been done, for example, for Britain by Jenkins (1997) and also by UNDP in deriving the
gender-related development index (UNDP, 1995). For a discussion of this index, see Bardhan and Klasen
(1999).
15This measure also satisﬁes the general form of the well-being measure W = µ(1−I) where I = 1 − A
µ .












This measure depends crucially on the exponent ε, the aversion to inequality factor.
The higher ε, the higher the penalty for inequality. We explicitly consider two cases,
ε = 2, denoted as A2, and ε = 1 (A1). In the latter case, the general form of the Atkinson






The Atkinson measures can be derived from social welfare functions that are additively
separable functions of individual incomes. Thus they are based on individualistic utility
functions where people only care about their own incomes. Inequality reduces welfare in
this formulation as the utility functions considered are concave for all ε > 0. All the
measures exhibit constant relative risk aversion. The ε = 1 has the additional property of
being based on a constant elasticity utility function, suggesting that a percentage increase
in income is valued the same regardless of its recipient. Such an assumption has quite a lot
of intuitive appeal. While clearly ε = 2 penalizes inequality more than ε = 1 and is thus
based on declining elasticity of income, the underlying assumption, that at twice the level
of income, a percentage increase in income is valued half as much as at the lower level
of income, also appears to be within the range of reasonable presumptions (see Deaton,
1997; UNDP, 1995). Such penalties of inequality are still consistent with ﬁndings from the
micro literature on utility and risk. Most of the non-utilitarian theories suggested above
would, in fact, likely require considerably higher inequality aversion.16 While the Atkinson
measures are typically based on individual incomes, our N refers to income quintiles only.
A third set of measures were proposed by Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974) which pre-
sented measures that combine income growth with redistribution. In particular, they
suggested a measure which they called a population-weighted or equal-weighted growth
rate which is simply the arithmetic average of the growth rates of each individual (or
quintile). Instead of treating a dollar increase the same regardless of its recipient, this
measure treats a percentage increase the same, thus also allowing for declining marginal
utility of income and exhibiting what they called the ’one person, one vote’ principle of
growth measurement. It turns out that this measure is a small-number approximation
of the Atkinson ε = 1 measure, which also weights a percentage increase the same re-
gardless of its recipient.17 Thus we will not report it separately here. But the similarity
between this measure and the Atkinson measure gives another quite nice justiﬁcation for
the Atkinson measure.
16A strict interpretation of Rawls lexicographic maximin principle would require ε to be inﬁnite (see
also Atkinson, 1970).
17It can be shown that the growth in the Atkinson measure with ε = 1 is simply the geometric mean
of the growth rates of individuals (or quintiles, depending on the unit of disaggregation), while the
population or equal weights measure is the arithmetic mean of the growth rates. For small numbers, one
is an approximation of the other. See Klasen (1994) for a discussion and application of the Ahluwalia and
Chenery measures.
8Similarly, their second growth measure, the welfare or poverty-weighted growth rate
(which gives greater weight to income increases of the poor than the rich) is a discrete
approximation of a version of the Atkinson with ε > 1. The Atkinson measure with ε = 2
measure will therefore yield very similar results.
Before turning to the data and the results, it is important to brieﬂy discuss the most
important diﬀerences between the measures.18 Apart from the penalty applied to in-
equality, the two Gini-based measures diﬀer quite fundamentally from the two Atkinson
measures (and thus the Ahluwalia and Chenery measures) in ways that are important
to consider. First, the two sets of measures respond diﬀerently to equal-sized income
transfers at diﬀerent points in the income distribution. While all measures are consis-
tent with the Dalton principle of transfers, the Atkinson measures obey what has been
called ’transfer sensitivity’, which means that an equal sized transfer will have a larger
impact on inequality (and thus on welfare) if it happens among the poorer sections of the
income distribution than if it happens among richer sections (Sen, 1997).19 Most would
agree that this is a desirable property. In contrast, the largest impact of an equal-sized
transfer using the Gini coeﬃcient will be among the mode of the income distribution,
i.e. among middle income groups as these transfers will have the largest impact on the
rank of the people aﬀected by the transfer and thus the weights attached to their incomes
(see Atkinson, 1970; Blackorby and Donaldson, 1978). While there is some justiﬁcation
for this (if income comparisons with others are very important, clearly shifts in income
which have a large impact on the ranking should be weighed heavily), most analysts see
this as a rather undesirably property of the Gini-based measures (e.g. Atkinson, 1970).
Second, the Atkinson measures are sub-group consistent and thus imply that any increase
in the income of a subgroup (or a reduction in inequality of that subgroup) will, ceteris
paribus, raise aggregate welfare. In contrast, an increase of income accruing to the rich-
est could actually lower aggregate welfare in the Gini-based measures as the increase in
mean income can be more than oﬀ-set by the increase in inequality.20 Some see this as
an argument in favor of the Gini-based measures (e.g. Sen, 1997; Dagum, 1990), others
see subgroup consistency as a valuable property. For our purposes it will suﬃce to note
that the Gini-based measures penalize inequality more if middle income groups are hurt
the most, while the Atkinson measure will penalize more if the poorest are hurt the most
by it. Which measure is ultimately a better indicator of welfare is left for the reader to
decide.
We will use these measures in diﬀerent ways. First, we will simply see how much
the incorporation of inequality reduces our impression of aggregate well-being. We will
therefore present data on how much well-being is reduced in a country at a point in time
by the amount of inequality that is present. This can be achieved by simply presenting
the ratio of inequality-adjusted income to per capita income. Second, we will examine
to what extent the incorporation of inequality changes the ranking of countries. These
applications will be used across countries as well as in an intertemporal analysis, where
we will look at the years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1998. Furthermore, we will study to
what extent the inclusion of inequality in the well-being measure will aﬀect our impression
18For a more extensive discussion of these issues, refer to Atkinson (1970), Blackorby and Donaldson
(1978), and Dagum (1990).
19The Dalton principle of transfers says that the value of an inequality measure must fall by a transfer
from a richer person to a poorer person which does not reverse their position in the income ranking.
20See Dagum (1990) for examples. This diﬀerence only appears if inequality is much more extreme than
the types of inequality existing in today’s world.
9of changes in well-being in selected countries. Finally, the global analysis concentrates on
the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1998 and tries to answer the question, how global welfare
changed during this period.
4 The Data
For both components of the measures, data on mean income and inequality, there are
several options. Our main source for data on inequality is the World Income Inequality
Database version 1.0 (WIID, 2000), which provides more than 5.000 Gini coeﬃcients and
associated distributions for 151 countries. The main sources used for assembling the data
set were Deininger-Squire data (Deininger and Squire, 1996), Luxembourg Income Study
(LIS, 2000), TransMonee Project (TransMonee, 1999) as well as other research studies
and information provided by various Central Statistical Oﬃces. To get recent data for
developing countries we also make use of Gini coeﬃcients and income shares provided by
the World Bank’s Poverty Monitor (WB, 2002). In WIID all observations are classiﬁed
as either ’reliable’ or ’less reliable’. We only use observations which are categorized as
’reliable’ and represent the entire population of a country.21 With respect to the income
concept used we concentrate on gross or net income, or on expenditures. Regarding the
unit of income recipient we consider data based on person (or household per capita), or
households. Only for few countries we have to rely on data that either have been adjusted
for household composition using an equivalence scale or where the income concept used
and the reference unit are unknown.22 In case, several Gini coeﬃcients with associated
distributions were available for a particular country at a particular point in time, those
observations were preferably chosen which allowed to have inequality data based on the
same or similar speciﬁcation across time.
Ideally, one would want to at least ensure that the indicators used are based on a con-
sistent deﬁnition of income and reference unit both across countries and time.23 Pursuing
this strategy would result in only a small number of countries and not allow a meaningful
international analysis. While in the main analysis we therefore have to contend with dif-
fering income concepts and reference units, in the sensitivity analysis, we try to generate
consistent data by making suitable adjustments to base all data on unequivalized gross
income per person.
Although WIID is probably the most comprehensive source on data on inequality,
data for the early years in our analysis are rare and we had to make some adjustments. In
case there is no Gini coeﬃcient and associated income shares for the particular point in
time, we used the nearest available data for our calculations. Despite these adjustments
our samples of countries for which we can calculate all measures are still quite limited.
Table 1 shows the diﬀerent years of available data on income distribution we have chosen
21Interestingly, it happens that data classiﬁed as ’not accepted’ in the Deininger-Squire data set, since
they are based on either no consistent source (cs) or unknown primary source (ps), are part of the ’reliable
data set’ in WIID. The opposite, that data belonging to the quality data set in Deininger-Squire data
but are categorised as ’not reliable’ in WIID, is also possible.
22For a discussion of the use of equivalence scales, please refer to Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding
(1995), Deaton (1997), and Ayala, Martinez, and Ruiz-Huerta (2001).
23Even if Gini coeﬃcients are based on the same deﬁnition of income and economic unit they might
not be comparable across countries, because of diﬀerences in sample methods, quality of surveys etc. (see
WIID, 2000).
10for the years 1960-1998. The greatest concessions we had to make are for less developed
countries like Pakistan, Panama and Chile in 1960, or for Nepal, Indonesia and Singapore
in 1970. But also for developed countries like Finland in 1960 and 1970, or Belgium and
Italy in 1970 major amendments have been necessary. For 1998, we use the latest available
income distribution estimate which in a few cases date as far back as 1990 or 1991, but
in most cases comes from the period 1993 to 1997.24
Regarding income data one could concentrate on per capita income, per capita dispos-
able income, or per capita consumption. To make our analysis comparable to international
comparisons of per capita income and to get the largest possible sample, we rely on per
capita gross national product as presented in the national accounts as the income con-
cept used.25 For the calculation of the well-being measures we make use of purchasing
power adjusted income data provided by the Penn World Table (PWT), versions 6.0 and
5.6 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2001; Summers and Heston, 1991).26 In addition, we
present data on GNP per capita based on oﬃcial exchange rates from the World Bank
for all years as well as the World Bank’s purchasing power adjusted income data for the
years 1980, 1990, and 1998 (WDI, 1999, 2001, 2002) for comparison.27
In our sensitivity analyses, we replace the data used with alternative estimates which
either diﬀer in the deﬁnition of income and/or reference unit or were provided by another
data source. Moreover, we estimate ﬁxed eﬀects panel regressions to try to address the
inconsistent treatment of the reference unit and the income concept, using similar pro-
cedures as used by Dollar and Kraay (2000) and Lundberg and Squire (1999). Using the
regression-based adjustments, all observations are based on gross income per person.28
For calculation of global well-being and changes thereof between 1970 and 1998, we
start by using a sub sample which consists of 72 countries that represent 81 per cent
percent of the world population in 1998. In order to reach such coverage and include some
of the populous and high population growth African and Middle Eastern countries, we had
to assume in some cases that income inequality remained stable throughout the period
studied and only income growth changed, as we have more data on the latter than the
former.29 However, our main analysis disregards many of the formerly socialist countries
since the PWT do not allow to calculate PPP adjusted per capita income for this group of
24In nearly all cases, we use the exact year for the income estimate under the (implicit) assumption
that changes in income distribution between adjacent years are typically smaller than changes in mean
income. Given positive average real income growth present in almost all countries which would bias
income comparisons from diﬀerent years, this assumption appears reasonable.
25Gross national product should better capture welfare of the population than gross domestic product
as the former includes earnings from abroad and excludes earnings by foreigners.
26The PWT 6.0 series we deal with is real per capita GDP, chain method (1996 prices) which is turned
to GNP per capita using a series that relates current GNP to GDP. This series is only included in version
5.6 and covers the period 1970-1992 for most countries. For the years 1960 and 1998 we adopt numbers
reported for the most adjacent years. Since for the vast majority of countries, GNP and GDP are of
similar magnitude and country speciﬁc ratios of both income measures are relatively constant over time,
these manipulations should not cause major problems.
27The World Bank data have been converted to 1996 prices using the US GDP deﬂator (WDI, 2002),
since 1996 is the base year used in the PWT 6.0.
28We have reﬁned the regressions to take note of criticisms made by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001)
regarding such regression-based adjustments. In particular, we take account of the possibility that the
diﬀerence between gross and net income may be larger in OECD countries.
29This way, we included all countries shown in Table 1 with at least two observations on inequality
between 1970 and 1998, except for Bulgaria (no income data in 1970 and 1980 available) and Sierra Leone
(civil war in the early 1990’s probably disrupted (economic) life seriously). The assumption of stability of
11countries. Since many of them experienced a considerable worsening in income inequality
during the transition period (Milanovic, 1998; Gruen and Klasen, 2001), ignoring them in
a global analysis of well-being may yield ﬂawed results. Therefore, we expand our sample
by 15 eastern European countries and successor states of the Soviet Union, covering now
86 per cent of the world population, and make a second analysis of global well-being for the
years 1988 and 1988 by using GNI per capita in PPP terms provided by WDI (2002). For
both samples we calculated average income per quintile for each country, sorted them in
ascending order to generate global income quintiles, and then calculated average incomes
of these world quintiles based on the population-weighted country quintiles contained in
each world quintile.30 We thus arrive at average income per ’world quintile’ which we
applied to the Atkinson measure with ε = 1 and ε = 2.
5 International Analysis
Table 2 presents the analysis for 1960 based on the six measures used. The ﬁrst two
measures are per capita income, using exchange rates and PPP, respectively. The next
two are the Atkinson measure with ε = 1 and the Sen measure, exhibiting a comparatively
’mild’ well-being penalty for inequality. The last two are the Atkinson (ε = 2) and the
Dagum measures with a more heavy implied well-being penalty for inequality. The analysis
is restricted to only 43 countries. Since they cover a wide spectrum of incomes, big changes
in ranks can only happen when there are very drastic diﬀerences between the measures.
Well-being, as estimated by our measures, falls drastically when considering inequality.
Using the Atkinson (ε = 1) or Sen measure, well-being falls by about 10-65 per cent, and
by 70 (Brazil and Mexico) to nearly 80 per cent (Gabon) in the Atkinson (ε = 2) and
Dagum measure. Existing inequality thus leads to fairly major reduction in measured
well-being in all the countries considered.
As expected from the discussion of inequality measures above, there are some diﬀer-
ences in the extent of ’penalty’ for inequality, depending on the measure used. This is to
be expected as the Gini-based measures give more emphasis to inequality in the middle
income groups, while the Atkinson measure places more weight on inequality among the
poorest groups. For example, Pakistan gets penalized less by the Atkinson (ε = 2) mea-
sure than the Sen measure, while the reverse is the case for the Philippines. The reason is
that in the Philippines the poorest do particularly badly and thus get a heavy penalty in
the Atkinson measure, while in Pakistan the middle income groups do relatively worse,
which attracts the higher penalty in the Gini-based measure.
In 1960, no assessment of inequality can dislodge the US from the highest rank in all
measures, and nothing can prevent Tanzania from being at the bottom of the list for all
indicators. Nevertheless, there are a range of interesting changes. First, there is a consid-
erable diﬀerence between the ranks using exchange rate and PPP, suggesting the presence
income distribution is, especially when compared to huge variations and changes in income growth levels,
reasonable as will be shown below and as has been found by others (e.g. Deininger and Squire, 1998;
Lundberg and Squire, 1999). Of the world’s 40 most populous countries in 1998, we include all except
Russia, Germany, Vietnam, Iran, Ukraine, Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar, Argentina, Sudan,
Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan.
30When a country quintile straddles the line between two world quintiles, we allocated the country
quintile proportionately to ensure that the world quintiles contain equal population numbers.
12of over- and undervalued exchange rates. As expected, the discrepancy is larger among
poorer countries, related to the undervaluation of the non-traded sectors. Second, there
are a number of interesting rank reversals when inequality is progressively being consid-
ered. For example, Bangladesh and Madagascar trade places between the pure income
and the broader well-being measures. In the two income measures Madagascar is four
ranks ahead; in the last two columns, Bangladesh is ﬁve ranks ahead.31 A similar reversal
occurs, somewhat surprisingly, between Britain and Sweden. Sweden is ahead in the pure
income measures, while Britain is ahead in measures that also consider distribution; in
fact, it mostly occupies the second highest spot in this list. This suggests that the very
low inequality in Sweden was not already present in the 1960s, and the rise of Britain
reminds us that Britain was among the more equal countries in Europe in 1960.32
Table 3 shows our rankings for 48 countries in 1970. Again there are large diﬀerences
between exchange rate based estimates of real incomes and PPP estimates, with the
discrepancy being largest among poorer countries. Considering inequality continues to
reduce well-being drastically. Once again, Brazil is one of the countries that lose most:
Well-being using the Dagum measure is 73 per cent below the level it would be if its per
capita income were equally distributed. The US remains on top in all measures except the
exchange rate adjusted income per capita measure, arguably the least reliable indicator of
well-being. At the bottom Nepal, Indonesia, and Sierra Leone vie for the worst spot. Some
more dramatic reversals in rank occur. Panama falls from number 25 in the exchange rate
list to number 41 in Atkinson (ε = 2) measure. Conversely, Sri Lanka rises from 16 ranks
below in the ﬁrst column to one rank above Panama once inequality is considered in the
Atkinson (ε = 2) measure. Unequal Brazil trades places with more equal Korea, and now
Sweden maintains its rank when inequality is being considered, while Britain’s fall in the
income rank cannot be completely compensated by its still comparatively low inequality.
Table 4 examines 57 countries for 1980. We now have one more indicator, PPP adjusted
income per capita from the World Bank (WDI, 2002), which we place alongside our
data from the Penn World Tables.33 The comparison suggests that the PPP adjustment
is subject to some margin of error. For example, China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand look a lot richer in the PPP adjustment from the Penn
World Tables than in the adjustment done by the World Bank while the reverse appears
to be the case for many Latin American countries.34 Several rank changes happen as a
result of these diﬀerences in the PPP adjustments.
The inequality-adjusted measures continue to be much lower than the income mea-
sure suggesting that inequality continues to have a big impact on well-being. Brazil and
31Colombia is another country that also falls considerably, once PPP and inequality is considered.
32Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) also report fairly high income inequality in Sweden in the 1960s. In
the LIS, Sweden is found to be considerably more equal than Britain. Since the LIS does not go back that
far, it is hard to tell whether the reported higher inequality in the 1960s is due to measurement error or
true eﬀects. See also sensitivity analysis and Atkinson and Brandolini (2001).
33The series used is GNI per capita, PPP in current international dollars. Gross national income is the
”sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the
valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income [...] from abroad” (WDI, 2002). To be comparable
to the data from the Penn World Tables we deﬂated this series to 1996 prices using the US GDP deﬂator
(WDI, 2002).
34Compared to earlier versions of the paper, the diﬀerences between the measures are of smaller mag-
nitude in general, since the PPP adjusted incomes provided by the Penn World Tables 6.0 are now based
on the ICP’s benchmark study of 1996. The World Bank’s PPP adjustments are grounded on the 1993
benchmark comparison.
13Colombia continue to suﬀer from the largest reductions in well-being which are also now
larger than previously, suggesting not only high but worsening inequality. Due to rising
inequality and catch-up growth, the US loses its top spot to Belgium in the Atkinson
(ε = 2) measure.35 Britain still rises in the ranks when inequality is considered. Unequal
Brazil and more equal Costa Rica now trade places; Brazil is two ranks ahead in PWT
PPP income (column 3), and Costa Rica is one to three places ahead in the inequality-
adjusted measures. Bangladesh, on the other hand, no longer improves its position as
much as before.36
Table 5 examines the per capita income and well-being in 70 countries in 1990. The
diﬀerences between the PWT and the World Bank PPP adjustments remain considerable,
but consistent in the sense that the diﬀerences in assessment in 1990 are largely the
same as for 1980. Well-being continues to be much lower than before; by and large, the
reduction appears to be similar to previous decades suggesting no general worsening (or
improvement) in income distribution.
Regarding rank reversals, Brazil and South Africa, two of the world’s most unequal
countries, get surpassed in the Atkinson measure (ε = 2) by Indonesia, a country 25 and
30 ranks, respectively, below in the income ranking with less than half the PPP income
per capita when compared to Brazil. That is to say, Brazil could generate the same level
of well-being with only half the income, if that income was as evenly distributed as it is
Indonesia.
Low levels of income and sizeable income inequality assure that many African countries
land at the bottom end in all measures. At the other end of the spectrum, the US only
retains the second spot in the PPP-adjusted income measures and the mildly penalizing
inequality adjusted measures. In the Dagum measure it is surpassed by Canada and
Luxembourg and, in the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure, additionally by Belgium and the
Netherlands. This fall in ranks of the US is mostly due to rising inequality there, compared
to the other countries (rather than diﬀerences in average income growth). Clearly, people
in the US are paying a price in terms of well-being due to the higher inequality there and
other countries do not suﬀer from the same problem (see Klasen (1994) and also below).37
Also in Britain, higher inequality ensures that Britain no longer rises in ranks and even
falls in some measures once inequality is considered (see below).
Table 6 shows the well-being measures for 71 countries in 1998. At the bottom end,
we again ﬁnd mostly African countries. Indonesia still improves in ranks and is ahead of
Peru in the Dagum and Atkinson (ε = 2) measures. Similarly, poorer Bulgaria and richer
Mexico trade places in two measures which also consider inequality. At the top end, the
US again leads the pack, with the exception of the ﬁrst ranking where oﬃcial exchanged
rates are used, since they experienced a substantial increase in income per capita and a
35The US loses especially in the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure as the poorest are particularly badly oﬀ in
the US. See also Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000).
36This is due to somewhat higher observed inequality in 1980, which falls again in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. To what extent this data point is an aberration, is diﬃcult to tell.
37Please note that these results diﬀer from Ayala, Martinez, and Ruiz-Huerta (2001) which, based on
micro data, ﬁnd that the US is surpassed only by Belgium in the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure, while Canada
and Sweden remain considerably worse oﬀ. The diﬀerence in ﬁndings is probably mainly due to the use
of the mean (gross) income variable based on national accounts used here, while in Ayala, Martinez, and
Ruiz-Huerta (2001) mean income refers to disposable income based on adjusted micro data. Other sources
of diﬀerences could be the diﬀerent PPP adjustments used (PWT versus OECD PPP adjustments), and
diﬀerences in the Gini coeﬃcients.
14comparatively small change in income inequality compared with 1990.38 Rising inequality
in Canada is ensuring that it is falling further behind, being surpassed by seven other
OECD countries in the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure.
It is hard to summarize the many particular ﬁndings from this discussion. But a
few points are worth noting. First, real income comparisons based on oﬃcial exchange
rates give a very misleading impression of well-being. In particular, they systematically
understate well-being in developing countries. At the same time, there are discrepancies
between the two sets of available PPP estimates. Second, consideration of inequality has a
large impact on well-being. Well-being falls by 15-75 per cent once we consider inequality.
The comparison of welfare levels between Indonesia and Brazil in Figure 1 is informative
here. Relying on unadjusted income measures, Brazil is far ahead of Indonesia in all years,
but once inequality is considered as well, Brazil’s welfare levels drop sharply and in 1998
Indonesia has not only closed the gap but, according to the newly introduced Atkinson
measure with ε = 5 reached a slightly higher welfare level than Brazil. Third, large
diﬀerences in inequality between countries lead to very large changes in rank. Brazil’s
drop in rank is a very dramatic illustration of this. Fourth, changes in inequality have
an important impact in some countries, most notably the US and Britain. This is nicely
illustrated in Figure 2 which examines the welfare levels for the US and Canada between
1970 and 1990. While the slopes of the curves for the US become steeper when going
from 1970 to 1990 thereby indicating rising inequality which leads to lower welfare levels,
Canada experiences declining inequality and is thus able, according to some measures,
to reach a higher welfare level than the US in 1990.39 Fifth, the combination of income
growth as well as levels and changes in inequality together can lead to very large diﬀerences
in changes in well-being. The comparison between Sri Lanka and Peru is instructive here
(see Figure 3). Sri Lanka combines comparatively low inequality with steady growth, Peru
experienced considerable ﬂuctuations in its mean income with relatively high inequality.
In 1998, despite being still poorer in income than Peru, Sri Lanka has already a higher
welfare level in the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure and adds to this lead if ε = 5 is assumed.
To assess whether these ﬁndings are due to peculiarities and inconsistencies of the
data chosen, we present a sensitivity analysis in the following.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
The robustness of our results is veriﬁed with the help of two diﬀerent approaches. Firstly,
we simply replace the data on income distribution used in the original analysis. For those
countries we have alternative data available which are either based on diﬀerent income
concepts and/or reference units or come from other data sources, we replace Gini coeﬃ-
cients and income shares, calculate the measures, rank the countries again and compare
the results with those obtained from the ﬁrst analysis.40
38This statement seems to be justiﬁed, even although the data on income distribution used in 1998
originally stems from 1991, since this is also the case for other OECD countries like Canada, Great
Britain, Italy, Netherlands, and Norway.
39Interestingly, Canada, despite its smaller income, also regularly surpasses the US in the Human
Development Index calculated by the United Nations Development Programme UNDP (2002).
40We restrict this replacing to alternative data which are based on the same year (plus/minus one year)
as was used in the main analysis.
15Table 7 shows the Gini coeﬃcients and their alternatives, what income concepts and
recipient units they are based upon as well as the resulting changes in rankings. The
simultaneous replacement approach leads mainly to no or only small changes in ranking.
However, in some cases major changes take place. The alternative Gini coeﬃcient used for
Jamaica in 1960 exceeds the one originally used by only 1.7 percentage points, which leads
to only little changes in ranking when focussing on the Gini based measures. However,
the income shares (which are not reported here) partly change considerably, leaving the
poorest 20 per cent with only half the income and increasing the share of income going
to the richest 20 per cent of population by almost 50 per cent. The Atkinson measures
answer these dramatic changes with notably lower ranks.
Turning to the year 1980, Canada and Norway experienced signiﬁcant changes in
ranking. For both countries the alternative Gini coeﬃcients were taken from LIS (2000)
and are based on the same speciﬁcations as the ones used in the original analysis. However,
the Gini coeﬃcients itself diﬀer considerably, thereby leading to changes up to 8 ranks.
Data on inequality provided by the Luxembourg Income Study are derived from micro
data sets and undergo diﬀerent strategies of top and bottom coding - both may contribute
to the existing diﬀerences.
Mexico in 1990 is another example of the bandwidth of inequality data available for
one particular point in time. Both Gini coeﬃcients were provided by Deininger and Squire
(1996) but belong to diﬀerent quality classiﬁcations. The main diﬀerence between the two
indices is the income share going to the richest 20 per cent of population, which amounts
to 59.3 per cent in the ﬁrst distribution but is declining to 53.6 per cent in the one
used alternatively. Consequently, distribution of income is more equal according to the
alternative data and especially the measures that penalize the existing degree of inequality
more rank Mexico up to 6 positions higher.
In a second kind of sensitivity analysis, we use a regression-based approach to deal with
the inconsistencies in terms of the income concepts and reference units used. We expand
our sample by adding data of countries not considered in the main analysis but which
are part of the reliable set in WIID (2000). This enables us to get several observations
per country at the same time which should improve our ability to identify the reference
unit and income deﬁnition eﬀects. In particular, we regress the Gini coeﬃcients available
on the income deﬁnition (expenditure, net income, unknown income, or gross income,
the excluded category), and the reference unit considered (household, family, unknown,
equivalized, or person, the excluded category). Following suggestions from Atkinson and
Brandolini (2001), we include dummy variables for Deininger-Squire data labelled as ’cs’
(no consistent source) and ’ps’ (primary source unknown).
Regression 1 in Table 8 shows that indeed the income deﬁnition and the choice of ref-
erence unit do matter. Expenditure-based and net-income or equivalized Gini coeﬃcients
are typically lower, while household-based Gini coeﬃcients appear to be higher.41 The
interaction term net income and OECD countries in the second regression shows that the
diﬀerence between gross and net income is largely a phenomenon of OECD countries, as
one would expect (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001).
41The somewhat surprising result about household-based Gini coeﬃcients was also found by Lund-
berg and Squire (1999). Note that the regressions here have considerably higher explanatory power (as
measured by the R-squared) as the ones used by Dollar and Kraay (2000) and Lundberg and Squire
(1999).
16We then adjust the Gini coeﬃcients based on the regression results from the ﬁrst es-
timation and thereby base all these adjusted Gini coeﬃcients on the omitted categories,
i.e. gross income per person. This way we should have dealt with the most glaring in-
consistencies, although further adjustments are surely possible (Atkinson and Brandolini,
2001).
How do the results change if one uses these adjusted Gini coeﬃcients for the calculation
of the Gini based measures? Table 9 shows that generally the results do not change greatly.
Using the Sen measure, the vast majority of rankings remain the same or change only
by one position. Regarding the Dagum measure, more signiﬁcant variations happen, but
again there is more persistence than change. In 1998, the year when most changes occur
due to the adjusted Gini coeﬃcients, less than 15 per cent of rank changes were by more
than one position. Moreover, most of the dramatic rank reversals and changes discussed
earlier still hold.42
These sensitivity analyses suggest that few of the basic results on the large absolute
impact of inequality and the change in ranks as a result of it reported are meaningfully
aﬀected by using diﬀerent data sets. However, quite a number of individual rankings
are aﬀected so that analyses that focus on these smaller diﬀerences, particularly among
OECD countries, should use more consistent data sources rather than rely on the rather
heterogeneous information (Ayala, Martinez, and Ruiz-Huerta, 2001).
7 Comparisons Across Time
The discussion in section 5 has already suggested that in some countries inequality has
changed considerably. At the same time, it appears that there is also a great deal of
stability in inequality measures which has also been found by Deininger and Squire (1998)
and Lundberg and Squire (1999). Most countries either seem to improve or worsen in rank
at a point in time when inequality is considered, with this relationship not changing much
over time. In this section we examine this question a bit more closely.
A ﬁrst impression can be gleaned from Table 10 which shows average Gini coeﬃ-
cients from the 1960s to the 1990s. What emerges is a great deal of stability. The average
Gini, whether raw or adjusted based on regression 1 in Table 8, does not appear to have
changed a lot (see also Deininger and Squire, 1998; Lundberg and Squire, 1999).43 This
average could, however, mask some variation. Therefore we specify ﬁxed and random ef-
fects regressions to examine this question closer. First, we want to see whether, controlling
for country-speciﬁc ﬁxed and random eﬀects, there are temporal trends in inequality. In
Table 11 speciﬁcations (1) and (2) show the results from the ﬁxed and random eﬀects
regressions.44 While the general impression of great stability is supported, results sug-
gest that, when compared to the 1990s, inequality was signiﬁcantly higher in the 1960s,
42For example, while Brazil and Indonesia still move towards similar welfare levels once inequality
is considered in the measurement, Brazil remains more ranks ahead in the inequality adjusted welfare
measures. This is mostly due to the fact that the Indonesian data are based on expenditures while the
Brazil data are based on gross incomes. Similarly, Britain rises less in the early years considered and it
falls more in the later years once the adjusted Gini is used, since an equivalence scale was applied to the
originally used data.
43The small observed changes could be due to compositional changes.
44The Hausman test suggests that random eﬀects would be preferable to use, although the results do
not diﬀer much.
17and signiﬁcantly lower in the 1980s, but the average diﬀerences were not very large in
magnitude.45
The last two speciﬁcations are ﬁxed eﬀects regressions testing for an intertemporal
Kuznets curve, i.e. the suggestion that as countries go through the process of development,
inequality ﬁrst worsens and then improves again. The results are quite clear here. There is
not even the smallest hint for such an inverse U relationship that would hold systematically
across all countries (see also Deininger and Squire, 1998; Lundberg and Squire, 1999). In
fact, speciﬁcation (4) rather suggests the opposite, namely a U shaped relationship, even
though it is not a very distinct curve. Thus, on average, there do not seem to be systematic
trends in income distribution that relate either to temporal trends or to trends in income.
It does not appear that inequality within countries is rising or falling systematically.
For our study of well-being, this is a signiﬁcant ﬁnding since it basically tells us that
assessments of changes in well-being will not change very much for most countries if we
switch from an income growth rate to a measure that growth rates in the distribution-
sensitive measures.
Figures 4 and 5 plot two typical examples. While Brazil and Indonesia diﬀer greatly
with respect to the degree of existing inequality, the income distributions itself did not
vary a lot in the last decades. This results in comparatively small diﬀerences between an
income growth rate and the growth rate of our distribution-adjusted income measures
(illustrated by similar height of the ﬁrst columns of each measure). At the same time, this
general stability masks some apparent rises and declines in inequality in those countries.
For example, in Brazil inequality appears to have become notably more unequal between
1961 and 1990, which in the sub-period 1981-1989 was accompanied by only moderate
income growth leading not only to smaller, but negative growth rates in the inequality
adjusted welfare measures, while since 1990 this trend has been reversed. Thus one should
not interpret longer-term stability as the absence of any developments in sub-periods
(see also Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001). Canada and Finland are two other examples
where changes in inequality diﬀered in diﬀerent time periods (Figures 6 and 7). Finland
is particularly notable for the fact that inequality appears to have declined considerably
since the 1980s leading to higher changes in well-being once inequality is considered.
Finally, the case of China (Figure 8) illustrates that considerable income growth is not
automatically associated with a worsening income distribution, although higher inequality
in the 1990s let the inequality adjusted growth rates become smaller.
It thus appears that the processes that led to increases in inequality in some rich
countries (notably the US and Britain) are not global processes or even processes that
aﬀect all industrialized countries the same.46 Despite some rhetoric to the contrary, all
rich countries do not appear to be condemned by global forces or other processes to
face ever-rising inequality. Although a careful investigation of this issue goes beyond the
scope of this paper, the diﬀerences in experience suggest that the role of economic policy
in generating and combating income inequality is quite considerable (see also Atkinson,
1997; Aghion and Williamson, 1998).
Despite this general rule, there are some notable exceptions and it is important to
emphasize that in some countries assessment of income growth seriously bias our view of
45These results are robust to using the adjusted Gini coeﬃcients.
46Based on the LIS, Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) ﬁnd that in the majority of OECD countries,
there was some increase in inequality in the 1980s. The timing and the extent diﬀered greatly, however,
and it was far from being a universal phenomenon. See also Ayala, Martinez, and Ruiz-Huerta (2001).
18changes in well-being. In particular, we will study Britain and the US.47 The impact of
inequality on changes in well-being in the US was already studied in Klasen (1994). Here
the analysis is extended to 2000 and some other measures are considered in addition.
Figure 9 shows the basic results. During the 1950s and the 1960s, high annual growth
was accompanied by falling inequality which ensures that increases in well-being were
considerably above the income growth rate. In contrast, in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s,
low to moderate income growth was accompanied by sharply rising inequality so that
well-being grew by negligible amounts. In fact, it shrank in the 1980s, depending on the
measure.48
Since economic growth has picked up since 1993 and unemployment is/was at a 30
years low, one may wonder how well-being changed in the so-called ’new economy.’ Figure
10 gives an impression. Income growth since 1993 has been still somewhat below the high
growth rates of the 1960s, and inequality continues to worsen (although at a much slower
pace) in the 1990s. This time, it is more due to greater income increases among the rich,
rather than deteriorations among the poor which was the case in the 1980s. This rising
inequality means that well-being in the ’New Economy’ is growing considerably more
slowly than in the much-maligned 1960s where high growth was accompanied by falling
inequality.
The story for Britain looks much the same (Figure 11). Based on the inequality series
produced by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS), in the 1960s and the 1970s, moderate
income growth was accompanied by falling inequality thus leading to sharper increases in
well-being. In the 1980s, moderate income growth translated into stagnation of well-being
once the sharply rising inequality is accounted for (see also Atkinson, 1997).
8 Global Well-Being and Inequality
As is well-known, global inequality is more of a result of inequality between nations
than inequality within nations (Anand, 1993; Berry, Bourguignon, and Morrison, 1991;
Milanovic, 2002). The richest 20 per cent of the world consume some 70-80 per cent of
world income (depending on the calculation and the countries included), leaving some 2-3
per cent to the poorest 20 per cent, which is far larger than the discrepancy between the
rich and poor in any one country (UNDP, 1999; Milanovic, 2002). As a result, we would
expect that consideration of this inequality between nations should have a considerable
impact on our measures of well-being. Figure 12, based on ’our world’ which captures
some 81 per cent of the population in 1998 but leaves out quite a few of the poorest as
well as many transition countries, shows that it does indeed. Using the Atkinson measures,
we ﬁnd that world well-being is less than half if we use ε = 1 and only about a quarter if
we use ε = 2 for all years considered. This is to say that ’our world’ would be as well oﬀ
as it is currently if it only had half or a quarter its income and distributed that evenly.
47Many formerly socialist countries experienced sharp increases in inequality during the period of
transition which was also accompanied by negative income growth. In Kyrgyz Republic and Ukraine this
resulted in dramatic welfare losses up to 75 per cent for the period 1988-1995 according to Atkinson
(ε = 2) and Dagum measures. See also Gruen and Klasen (2001).
48Also here, one can nicely see the diﬀerence between the Gini-based measures and the Atkinson
measures. The poorest did particularly badly in the 1980s and the Atkinson measure with ε = 2 shows a
deterioration in well-being.
19Including the missing poor countries would lead to even more dramatic reductions in
well-being. Global inequality is not just a political, economic, and social problem, it is a
welfare problem as it reduces aggregate global well-being considerably.
Figures 12 and 13 also show that global inequality in our restricted world does not
seem to have increased a great deal over the last 30 years. While it was relatively stable
between 1970 and 1980, it decreased quite remarkably since then. The growth of the
Atkinson measures far surpasses the growth in mean global income, particularly in the
1980s. This is mostly due to high and fairly evenly spread per capita growth in China and
India, as well as high growth in other dynamic Asian economies which push up income
growth of the poorest three quintiles of the world income distribution, as Figure 12 shows
(see also Schultz, 1998).
Income growth and changing distribution could also result in a considerable degree of
income mobility. Table 12 illustrates how many country quintiles fall into the particular
global quintiles and what changes took place between 1970 and 1998. According to the
admittedly rather crude measure, there seems to be a great deal of stability, since 203 out
of the 360 country quintiles belong to the same world quintile in both years.49 Furthermore,
this stability is very much concentrated at the lower and upper tail of the world income
distribution, which was already found by Quah (1993). In case of the richest global quintile
this ﬁnding can be attributed to many OECD economies, which, except for their poorest
country quintiles, already succeeded in 1970 to belong entirely to this income group.
Turning to the bottom end, most African countries considered in this analysis could not
drop out of the lowest spots in the global income distribution.50 Among the population
that managed to move upwards and reached the highest income category in 1998 are the
second to fourth quintiles of Korea as well as the poorest three quintiles of Singapore.
Similar upward mobility can be observed for Indonesia, China, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and
Thailand, while many African countries like Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya
as well as Bangladesh, Colombia, and Guatemala exhibit downward mobility. In 1998,
their country quintiles are found among lower global quintiles than in 1970.
By looking at the results obtained from our expanded sample which considers 15
transition countries in addition, it becomes clear, that the assessment of global inequality
and well-being is to some extent driven by sample size, the period considered, and the
choice of income data. In this second global analysis, we use PPP adjusted income data
provided by the World Bank (WDI, 2002). As is evident from Tables 4-6, the World
Bank’s calculation assumes that incomes in some of the poorer countries are somewhat
lower than in the Penn World Tables, which will lead to higher global inequality. In 1998,
global welfare level is of similar magnitude for both samples, with the discrepancy being
larger among poorer quintiles. Turning to changes in well-being during the last decade,
the two samples tell diﬀerent stories. As shown in Figure 14, the ﬁrst four global quintiles
of the larger sample still realized positive income growth between 1988 and 1998, but at
considerably lower rates. The richest world quintile, however, experienced negative income
growth. This somewhat surprising result is largely caused by dramatic income losses that
many of the socialist countries had to deal with during the transition period. In 1988, the
richest country quintiles of 16 transition countries fall into the ﬁfth world quintile; out of
them eight still belong to it in 1998, despite having realized considerably income losses.
49In fact, income mobility is much higher, since there is a lot variability within each world quintile.
50The increasing number of country quintiles falling into the poorest world quintile is mainly due to
the fact, that the second poorest quintile of China could climb into the next income category.
20These losses cannot be balanced out by positive income growth in other countries, and
the average income for the richest 20 per cent of the world’s population considered here is
declining. On the other hand, although both the inclusion of transition countries and the
use of the World Bank’s income data lead to higher inequality at a global level, the trend
of declining inequality since the 1980s is not aﬀected, as the growth rates of the Atkinson
measures exceed the growth of mean income.
Thus, in line with some other studies (e.g. Schultz, 1998) but in contrast to ﬁndings
from studies by UNDP (1999) and Milanovic (2002), there has not been a uniform rise
in global inequality, nor has there been no mobility of countries up and down the world
income distribution.51 Including even more of the poorest countries would, however, some-
what temper this assessment as they are likely to have contributed to increasing global
inequality and less mobility.
Clearly, global inequality is associated with major reductions in well-being. In fact,
the reductions are larger than similar reductions within countries since inter-country in-
equality is so much larger than intra-country inequality. At the same time, high growth in
China and India, where most of the world’s poor live, and considerably mobility suggest
that we are not necessarily facing a world of rising and ever more rigid global distribution.
9 Summary and Conclusion
From a theoretical point of view, the inclusion of income inequality in a measure of well-
being is well justiﬁed. Here, we tried to demonstrate, what impact the various measures
have when applied to a rich set of data. Summarizing the multi-faceted results, it ﬁrstly
can be said that the consideration of the distribution on income aﬀects our assessment
of absolute well-being at a country and, even more so, at a global level. Secondly, it
frequently alters the ranking of countries drastically. Regarding comparisons across time
we found that in some countries the impression of changes in well-being diﬀers when level
and changes of inequality are taken into account. Thus, we conclude that it seems worth
exploring the linkages between growth, inequality, and well-being further.
The global analysis showed, that the last decades have seen periods, where global
inequality was rising and falling, where countries moved upwards and downwards the
world income distribution, suggesting that there is scope for economic policy to inﬂuence
within-country inequality which then also aﬀect global inequality.
Being aware that much of the data we applied were not intended to be used in such
examinations, we tried to verify our results. We found that although data on inequality
are still not suﬃciently consistent neither across time nor across countries, many of the
main ﬁndings are relatively robust. The late 1990s have seen the evolution of the World
Income Inequality Database which provides easy access to indexes and distributions as
well as quality ratings thereby enabling us to make a careful choice. Despite these already
immense improvements, future developments should be directed at generating consistent
and internationally comparable time series on inequality.
51Milanovic (2002) uses micro data to generate estimates for global inequality in 1988 and 1993. He
ﬁnds sharply rising global inequality. The diﬀerence between his and our ﬁnding is probably due to the
choice of time period, the large representation of transition economies in his data set, and the use of mean
income ﬁgure that is based on micro data and may bear little resemblance with national accounts data
used here.
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42Table 8: Determinants of Gini coeﬃcients
(1) (2)
Expenditure -3.89∗∗ (0.38) -3.59∗∗ (0.38)
Net income -1.94∗∗ (0.27) 1.38∗∗ (0.47)
Unknown income 1.66 (1.43) 1.81 (1.40)
Household 0.99∗∗ (0.28) 1.09∗∗ (0.27)
Family 0.73 (0.45) 0.85 (0.44)
Unknown reference unit -1.51 (1.55) -1.45 (1.52)
Equivalized -4.72∗∗ (0.30) -4.46∗∗ (0.29)
Primary source unknown 1.81∗∗ (0.63) 1.93∗∗ (0.61)
No consistent source -0.31 (0.25) -0.34 (0.24)
OECD * Net income -4.74∗∗ (0.55)
Intercept 36.03∗∗ (0.26) 35.84∗∗ (0.26)
N 2070 2070
R2 0.21 0.24
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%; Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 9: Change in rankings due to adjusted Gini coeﬃcients
No change 1 Rank 2 Ranks 3 Ranks 4+ Ranks
Sen measure
1960 35 7 0 0 1
1970 28 18 2 0 0
1980 26 22 6 2 1
1990 42 22 3 3 0
1998 37 24 7 2 1
Dagum measure
1960 24 12 7 0 0
1970 29 14 1 4 0
1980 26 21 7 3 0
1990 31 21 15 3 0
1998 29 33 6 1 2
Table 10: Average Gini coeﬃcients over time
Average Number of
Year Average Gini adjusted Gini observations
1960s 37.9 38.6 197
1970s 34.8 36.2 427
1980s 32.7 34.7 780
1990s 34.3 36.6 666
Adjusted Gini coeﬃcients are based on regression 1 reported in Table 8.
43Table 11: Temporal trends in inequality and Kuznets curve
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 34.55∗∗ (0.19) 39.77∗∗ (0.89) 37.22∗∗ (0.82) 40.63∗∗ (1.06)
Dummy 1960s 1.31∗∗ (0.40) 1.36∗∗ (0.40)
Dummy 1970s -0.45 (0.32) -0.44 (0.32)
Dummy 1980s -1.23∗∗ (0.26) -1.24∗∗ (0.26)
Income per capita -0.20∗∗ (0.06) -0.75∗∗ (0.16)
Income per capita, inverse 1.03 (1.61)
Income per capita, squared 0.02∗∗ (0.00)
N 2070 2070 1570 1570
R2 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%; Standard errors in parentheses.
Speciﬁcation (1) estimates ﬁxed eﬀects, speciﬁcation (2) random eﬀects. Reference category is the
period 1990-1998. Speciﬁcations (3) and (4) test for the Kuznets hypothesis using a ﬁxed eﬀects
estimation.
Table 12: Income mobility, 1970-1998
1998
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1st 35 7 0 0 0
2nd 25 10 4 2 0
1970 3rd 16 13 13 6 0
4th 4 14 28 47 28
5th 0 0 0 10 98
Rows and columns show the number of country
quintiles falling into the ﬁrst to ﬁfth world
quintile in 1970 and 1998, respectively.










GNP/cap GNI/cap RGNPCH Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Atkinson (e=5) Dagum
IDN 1980 BRA 1980 IDN 1990 BRA 1990 IDN 1998 BRA 1998
Notes: GNP/cap: GNP per capita, constant 1996 US-Dollars (WDI, 1999, 2001). GNI/cap: Real GNI per
capita, 1996 prices (WDI, 2002). RGNPCH: Real GNP per capita, 1996 prices (Summers and Heston,
1991; Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2001).








GNP/cap RGNPCH Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Atkinson (e=5) Dagum
CAN 1970 USA 1970 CAN 1980 USA 1980 CAN 1990 USA 1990
Notes: For deﬁnition of incomes see notes in Figure 1.








GNP/cap GNI/cap RGNPCH Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Atkinson (e=5) Dagum
LKA 1980 PER 1980 LKA 1990 PER 1990 LKA 1998 PER 1998
Notes: For deﬁnition of incomes see notes in Figure 1.









Income weights Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen Dagum
1961-97 1961-80 1981-89 1990-97
Notes: The income concept used here is GDP per capita at market prices in constant local currency
(WDI, 2002).









Income weights Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen Dagum
1977-95 1977-80 1981-90 1991-95
Notes: See notes in Figure 4.








Income weights Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen Dagum
 1965-91 1965-79 1980-91
Notes: See notes in Figure 4.











Income weights Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen Dagum
1967-97 1967-77 1978-87 1988-97
Notes: See notes in Figure 4.








Income weights Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen Dagum
1981-97 1981-90 1991-97
Notes: See notes in Figure 4.












Income weights Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen  Dagum
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99
Notes: Calculations are based on U.S. census data.








Poorest 20% Richest 20% Income
weights
Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen Dagum
1961-1968 1993-2000
Notes: See notes in Figure 9.








Income weights Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen Dagum
1962-91 1962-69 1970-79 1980-91
Notes: See notes in Figure 4.
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